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Abstract: In the last 30 years genre scholars have explored the ideological dimension of genre, illustrating 
how genres compel individuals to act in certain ways and how individuals respond to them. This article 
takes the ideological view of genre and analyzes the problem of knowledge mobilization as an ideological 
negotiation between research and legal genres. Using Foucault’s will to truth and Bhatia’s colonization, 
this case study analyzes one Canadian public inquiry that used psychology research and influenced many 
legal and policy documents. The analysis of the commission report, transcripts from the preliminary 
hearing, and interviews reveal the manner in which judicial ideology is inscribed in judicial genres that 
regulate the extent and manner of knowledge mobilization.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Genre scholars have long noted that genre is ideological 
(DEVITT, 2004; FREEDMAN, 1996; MILLER, 1984), and a number of 
researchers in the last twenty years have amply demonstrated the ways in 
which genres compel individuals to act in certain ways (PARÉ, 1993, 
2002; SEGAL, 1993) and, to a lesser extent, the ways in which 
individuals respond to ideology embedded in genres (ARTEMEVA, 
2007). More recently, however, genre scholars have turned to investigate 
the nature of interactions among multiple genres (BHATIA, 2002; 
BAZERMAN, 1994; DEVITT, 1991, 2004; SPINUZZI, 2004), and 
subsequently, issues in genre and ideology are no longer limited to the 
ones that take place within a single genre but how ideology is negotiated 
at the intersection of multiple genres (ARTEMEVA; FREEDMAN, 
2001). 
One such intersection is the crossroads among (social) science 
research, law, and public policy, in which knowledge mobilization from 
(social) science research is simultaneously encouraged (JASANOFF, 
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2005) and contested (PRIVEN, 2001) by policy makers and courts. 
Analyzing this problem of knowledge mobilization as an ideological issue 
is not new, as many political scientists have done so (CARDEN, 2005; 
CAPLAN, 1979). However, these analyses typically do not emphasize 
the role of discourse or genre; even when they do mention language (e.g., 
COURT; HOVLAND; YOUNG, 2005), these analyses take structuralist 
views on language, and their analyses do not reflect the rhetorical 
approach that genre scholars often take for granted. For these reasons, 
analyzing the problem of knowledge mobilization from the perspective 
of genre theory adds to the existing interdisciplinary endeavor. At the 
same time, such analysis reveals the ways in which ideology is negotiated 
at the intersections of genres from multiple domains. 
In order to achieve these objectives, this article provides a case 
study from one Canadian public inquiry that illustrates the ideological 
and discursive negotiations between scholarly genres and judicial genres. 
These negotiations reveal the complex process of knowledge 
mobilization and the role of language in this process. 
 
2. KNOWLEDGE MOBILIZATION 
 
Political scientists who studied knowledge mobilization rejected 
the idea that the process is a direct application of research to policy 
(CAPLAN, 1979). Rather, they understood the role of research as 
“enlightenment” (WEISS, 1979), interacting with other elements in a 
particular context (CARDEN, 2005, JASANOFF, 2005; KINGDON, 
1984). Science and law have a number of fundamental (but legitimate) 
differences that make it difficult to understand one another. These 
differences include: the overall systemic approach, the verification 
method, repeatability of the “experiment,” the criteria, the 
conceptualization of “truth,” the source of data (findings), the role of 
social factors, and the power relationship (BERTIN; HENIFIN, 1994; 
JASANOFF, 1995; MATSON, 1999; NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, 2002; SHAPIRO, 1981) (see Figure 1). 
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 Science Law 
System Consensus seeking Adversarial 
Verification Replication, Peer-review Cross-examination 
Repeatability Experiments are repeatable 
(thus will happen in the 
future) 
Theories to be proved in 
the court occurred in the 
past and unrepeatable 
Criteria alpha level, depending on the 
discipline (e.g. .05 for social 
sciences; .001 for medical) 
“beyond reasonable doubt” 
“likelier than not” 
Truth Tentative and mutable Must be final in a short 
time (for the purpose of 
resolving a dispute) 
Findings Forward-looking (assumes 
tentativeness of the present 
“truth”) 
Backward-looking (rely on 
precedents for “truth”) 
Social 
Factors 
(in natural science) social 
factors and social justice as 
largely irrelevant. 
Social factors and social 
justice as integral to the 
decision making process. 
Power Experts are in charge of the 
dialogue (and they are 
roughly equal) 
Dialogues are controlled 
by the judge and the 
lawyers (not by the 
experts) 
 
Figure 1 – Some critical differences between science and law 
 
The court’s struggle to strike the right balance is highlighted in 
several cases in the twentieth century. Through Frye v. United States in 
1923, the American judicial system established that an expert is admitted 
only if s/he meets the “general acceptance” principle. This rule has been 
expanded through Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals in 1993, which 
added the following three admissibility criteria: 
 
1. the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data 
2. the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods 
3. the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case. (Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702) 
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While critics (e.g. BERTIN; HENIFIN, 1994) questioned the trial 
judge’s ability to evaluate (social) scientific methods, judicial authority 
was reinforced and extended through General Electric Co. v. Joiner and 
Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael.  
The admissibility standard in Canada has been historically 
somewhat different from the U.S., but Glancy and Bradford (2007) argue 
that the Canadian standard is becoming much closer to the Daubert rules 
through recent decisions. 
Prior to 1994, the Canadian admissibility standard was rather lax, 
admitting most experts as long as they were “helpful.” But through R v. 
Mohan in 1994, the court established that the admissibility standards were 
to be based on 1) relevance, 2) necessity, 3) absence of exculpatory rule, 
and 4) proper qualification. Perhaps the most important Canadian case 
occurred in 2000 when Judge Binnie explicitly referred to the Mohan 
criteria as outdated and appealed to the Daubert criteria as the test of 
reliability in admitting experts. 
 
3. DISCOURSE, IDEOLOGY, AND GENRE 
 
Just as much as ideology is relevant to political science and law, 
language scholars have explored the connection between language and 
ideology (e.g. BHATIA, 2002; DEVITT, 2004; DIJK, 2001; HUCKIN, 
2002; WODAK, 1995). Many of these scholars use the concepts from 
theories of hegemony (e.g., GRAMSCI, 1971; LACLAU; MOUFFE, 
1985 as cited in FAIRCLOUGH, 1992) and identify language as a 
manifestation of or a tool for “opaque as well as transparent structural 
relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control” 
(WODAK, 2004, p. 204). These assumptions of language are applied to 
the problem of knowledge in Foucault (1972a, 1972b), who attempted to 
explain the creation and maintenance of knowledge through shifts in 
epistemic authority, will to truth, and rules of exclusion. 
To explain the creation of “truth,” Foucault (1972a) notes a 
particular shift in authority from the author of a statement to the 
statement itself. He illustrates this point with Greek poets, who 
determined truthfulness of the statements by the credibility of the 
speakers and the manner of their speaking. Yet, the truthfulness, which 
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had derived from the speaker, was later ascribed to the internal property 
of the statement itself. This process of separating and obscuring the 
source of authority is further developed with the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century English scientists, who rhetorically constructed 
measurements, classification schemata, particular viewpoints, and 
terminologies (e.g. “look rather than read, verify rather than comment” 
[p. 218]) to satisfy their will to knowledge. This will to knowledge and the 
will to truth populate the discursive formation of science to hide the 
rhetoricity from the system: 
 
True discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire 
and power, is incapable of recognising the will to truth which 
pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed itself upon us 
for so long, is such that the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to 
mask it (p. 219). 
 
If knowledge-making is discursive, so is creation and maintenance 
of power, and Foucault (1972b) points out the ideological nature of 
scientific knowledge. Using “madness” as an example, Foucault contrasts 
the discursive formations of medical knowledge in the classical time and 
that of psychopathology in the nineteenth century to point out that 
scientific discourse in nineteenth century psychopathology was a 
localized discursive formation within larger discursive formations. 
According to Foucault (1972a), power is accrued in this theoretical 
framework by this discursive relationship and the rules of exclusions that 
regulate what can be spoken of , where and how it can be spoken, and 
who is authorized to speak of it (p. 216). His example comes from 
Mendel, whose work on heredity was unappreciated by the early 
nineteenth century botanist. Foucault argues that these rules of exclusion 
prohibited Mendel from participating in the discursive formations 
because Mendel discussed his work using theories and terminologies that 
were not part of the discipline of botany in his time. 
Another important analytical framework is Bhatia’s (2002) theory 
of genre colony and the concept of colonization. The former refers to a 
collection of genres that are characterized by a general communicative 
purpose, such as promotion, introduction, and reporting. Because these 
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purposes are general, genres that belong to each colony cut across the 
traditional disciplinary and professional boundaries. But what is 
important here is the process of colonization, which: 
 
[...] involves invasion of the integrity of one genre by another 
genre or genre convention, often leading to the creation of a 
hybrid form, which eventually shares some of its genre 
characteristics with the one that influenced it in the first place (p. 
58). 
 
Bhatia illustrates this colonization process through the advertising 
genre, which clearly invaded the territorial integrity of many genres, such 
as academic, corporate, political, journalistic, and other genres. As a 
result, many of these genres now contain a wide variety of rhetorical and 
linguistic elements borrowed from the advertising genre, expanding the 
territory of the promotional genre colony. 
As this case study will show, these concepts allow us to recognize 
the ideological nature of language and genre and to analyze the 
ideological and discursive negotiations that take place between (social) 
science and law. 
 
4. METHOD 
 
In order to examine the ways in which ideology is negotiated at an 
intersection of genres and how that interaction affects knowledge 
mobilization, this study examines one Canadian public inquiry, known as 
the Sophonow Inquiry. This case was chosen because it exemplifies a 
successful instance of knowledge mobilization and it clearly involved 
multiple genres from different domains. 
 
4.1 The Sophonow Inquiry 
 
The Sophonow Inquiry is a public inquiry in response to the 
wrongful conviction and incarceration of Thomas Sophonow from 
Winnipeg, who spent four years in prison. A public inquiry is a 
government-initiated review that establishes facts and causes of an event 
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of some public significance and makes recommendations to the 
government. The process is similar to a court proceeding in that the 
commissioner, acting like a judge, summons witnesses to a preliminary 
hearing, who undergo direct and cross examinations by counsels that 
represent all stakeholders. Through the preliminary hearing, the 
commissioner produces a report that typically includes recommendations 
that call for specific policy changes. While commissions are not required 
to use research data, it is not uncommon for the commissions to do so. 
Similarly, the recommendations are not binding, but it is not uncommon 
for the government to follow these recommendations. 
The ostensive mission of the Sophonow Inquiry was particular, 
but the Sophonow Inquiry was one of a series of public inquiries in 
Canada (e.g., the Marshall Inquiry, the Morin Inquiry) that contributed to 
a change in the Canadian judicial system to incorporate research findings 
in psychology from the 1970s and 80s, thus particularly appropriate for 
the current case study. 
 
4.2 Data 
 
The materials in this case study include: the commission report, 
the transcript from the preliminary hearing, interviews with the 
commissioner, the lead counsel, and two of the expert witnesses. The 
interview with the commissioner included a discourse-based interview to 
see what explanations (if any) he would provide for his rhetorical choices 
in writing the commission report. 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
As predicted from the literature, participants in this study 
articulated a nuanced argument about the role of experts in judicial 
genres. Both the commissioner and the lead counsel noted the ways in 
which experts can serve the judicial system, but their wording made it 
clear that the experts should not take the center stage. In the lead 
counsel’s words: 
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I think there’s a role for experts, but I think we have to be careful 
that experts don’t dominate the courtroom. It ought not to be a 
battle of experts. The ultimate decision ought to be left at the 
judge, but the law in Canada on expert evidence is that beyond 
the expertise of the prospective juror, then and it’s not junk 
science, then the experts should be allowed to offer opinions. 
 
The statements from the participants suggest that there is a 
mechanism to maintain this judicial control while selectively allowing 
knowledge mobilization from academic genres. As the following analysis 
shows, judicial genres contain features that both limit and facilitate 
knowledge mobilization from academic genres. Furthermore, the judicial 
ideology governs these genres in such a way to obscure this knowledge 
mobilization process. 
 
5.1 Limiting knowledge mobilization 
 
One obvious way in which judicial genres restrict the influence of 
academic genre is the rules and procedures. This genre (including the 
specific document that governs this specific public inquiry) reflects the 
judicial development in the last 20 years (e.g., The Supreme Court 
trilogy) to strengthen the role of the commissioner in interpreting the 
relevant admissibility rules. This genre, then, affords the discretionary 
power to the commissioner in selecting which experts are admissible and 
which ones are not. 
The rules and procedures also explicitly govern conversation 
“turns” in the preliminary hearing, thus, serving as what Giltrow (2002) 
calls a meta-genre. Next to the commissioner, counsels occupy a more 
powerful discursive position, relative to the testifying experts because 
they are formally given their turns, and they occupy the discursive role of 
questioners. This role is easily inferred through grammatical modes, as 
most interrogatives in the transcripts are used by counsels. Furthermore, 
each turn by a counsel is labeled as “Q” in the transcript to signify his or 
her de jure and de facto role, as illustrated in the following interchange. 
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(1) 
Q Just to follow up on what you said in answer to Mr. 
Commissioner’s question, Dr. O’Shaughnessy, Dr. Sheilah 
Martin, a Compensation Expert, gave evidence to the 
Commission yesterday and the day before about the distinction in 
her mind between a single event trauma, a single intrusive 
experience on the one hand, and a process of harm that is 
continually inflicted on a daily basis, on the other hand. I take it 
that is what you have just been talking about? 
A Yeah, basically. I mean, not from a compensation perspective, 
obviously, but, yeah, there are significant psychiatric differences. 
Q Yes. Yes. Now, you describe some of the symptoms that he 
has exhibited over the years as quite disturbing. Those words 
appear at the last complete paragraph at the first sentence of the 
last paragraph on page six. 
A Yes 
(p. 1600-1601) 
 
In addition to these explicitly documented advantages, counsels 
have additional advantage over experts through their genre competence. 
Lawyers use various discourse strategies to control the utterances of the 
experts, who are often less competent in this genre (GIBBONS, 2003; 
MATSON, 1999; SHUY, 2006). Such discourse strategies are quite 
obvious in the discourse data from this preliminary hearing: 
 
(2a) All right. Because that case doesn’t really stand for the 
proposition that wrongful incarceration would necessarily breach 
Section 7 of the Charter all by itself, does it? (p. 1441) 
(2b) Is it fair to categorize these together as fear of re-
victimization? (p. 1783) 
(2c) In your view, if a trial judge alerted a jury to some of the 
failings of the type of evidence that you have commented on 
here, the photo pack and some of the eyewitnesses as to 
potential, I use the word tainting, or exposure to things that 
might adversely affect their recollection; if a trial judge is 
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relatively careful in alerting the jury to the potential of that 
recollection not being accurate because of those facts, do you say 
that that is sufficient education of the jury? (p. 9046) 
 
(2a) is an example of a tag question, and (2b) is an example of a 
formulaic expression (“Is it fair...?”) that paraphrases the expert 
testimony in a particular manner. (2c) is an example of a hypothetical 
question. Like many hypothetical questions in the courtroom, this 
question is not hypothetical at all but is presented hypothetically to elicit 
particular answers from the witness. When the expert answered this 
question by rejecting some of the premises in the question, it was quickly 
revealed that the question was not hypothetical at all, and the expert 
could not reject the premises because they had already happened in the 
Sophonow case. (2d)  
Perhaps as a result of these discursive strategies, there was a 
systematic imbalance in the average length per turn between counsels 
and testifying experts. Overall the average length per turn was 
approximately the same between counsels and experts, but experts’ turns 
were a mix of very short and very long answers whereas counsels’ turns 
typically fell between these two extremes. Experts’ long turns reflect 
their expert knowledge, which sometimes required long turns to present 
their complex analyses, but it is their short turns and the counsels’ 
relatively lengthy questions that reveal the counsels’ discursive strategies. 
In fact, a significant number of expert turns were short responses, 
containing one or few words (e.g. “Yes.” “That’s correct.” “He did.” 
“That’s right.” “Indeed.”) with optional restatements of the questions. 
These short turns constituted 1227 of 2368 expert turns (51.8%), 
indicating the prevalence of interchanges like (1), consistent with the 
literature on legal discourses (e.g. GIBBONS, 2003; SHUY, 2006) as well 
as manuals for lawyers, which teach them to control and domesticate 
expert responses. 
These discursive moves, along with the discursive context, are 
what make the preliminary hearing a discursive gatekeeper of the legal 
community. These discursive moves also make it possible for the legal 
community to impose its own will onto other discourses. Therefore, any 
utterances that are produced under this condition should be seen as a 
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legal discourse even though the utterances may contain discursive 
features of non-legal genres. 
 
5.2 Facilitating knowledge mobilization 
 
Even under such constraints, experts appear to have meaningful 
influence, but the influence appears to occur because of these legal 
constraints, not despite them. As the analysis in this section shows, the 
influence of research and academic genres seldom comes from scholarly 
journals but mostly from the experts’ re-articulations of them in the 
preliminary hearing. The first pair (3a and 3b) illustrates the differences 
in the influence of academic genre and also differences in language 
between a research article and the commission report. 
 
(3a) [Research Article] The average estimate of duration across 
66 subjects was 147.3 s, which confirms earlier findings of time 
overestimation for complex events. Only two (3 per cent) 
subjects estimated a duration that was equal to or less than the 
true value of 30 s (p. 5) 
(3b) [Commission Report] Interestingly, witnesses almost 
always think that an event took place over a longer period of time 
than it actually did. (p. 27) 
 
All three sentences in (3a) and (3b) are syntactically identical in 
that each sentence is complex with one subordinate clause, but (3a) 
morphologically contains greater nominalizations (e.g. estimate, duration, 
overestimation). Rhetorically (3a) emphasizes precision through 
presentation of quantitative data, and it maintains a more hesitant stance 
toward generalization by preserving the source of knowledge. 
By comparison (3b), which could be nominalized as “witness’ 
overestimation of an event,” does not resort to nominalization, and the 
sentence is rhetorically constructed to present the information as a 
generalizable fact. This rhetorical generalization is partly achieved by 
obscuring the source and the process of the knowledge, which makes it 
more difficult for the reader to contest it. 
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While the comparison of language between research articles and 
the commission report yields few similarities, a comparison between the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing and the commission report yields 
more obvious connections. The paired excerpt in (4) comes from 
sections in the preliminary hearing and the commission report that 
explain the basic model of how memory functions. 
 
(4a) [Transcript] So the first stage is the acquisition stage. This is 
a period of time where an event occurs and some information is 
laid down in the memory system. And then when the event is 
over, time passes. We call this stage the retention stage. And 
finally there’s a period of time, another stage that we call the 
retrieval stage. This is when a person tries to retrieve information 
from memory to answer questions about what happened, to look 
at photographs and try to make an identification. These are all 
different acts of retrieval. Our job then as researchers in this area 
is to identify the factors that come into play at each of these 
stages that affect the accuracy of somebody’s memory (p. 8922-
8923). 
(4b) [Commission Report] The acquisition phase represents the 
time when an event occurs and some information is stored in the 
memory system. After the event is over, time passes and this 
period is referred to as the retention stage. Finally, there is the 
retrieval stage. This occurs when a person attempts to retrieve 
information from the memory in response to questions as to 
what happened. For example, retrieval takes place when a witness 
is asked to look at photographs in order to try to mak 
 
In addition to the obvious ideational repetitions, one can readily 
see the linguistic repetitions at the levels of lexical, phrasal, and even 
clausal. Just in the first few lines, we see the reiteration of: the acquisition 
stage (noun phrase), time (lexical item), an event occurs and some information is 
... in the memory system (two clauses). Furthermore, the morphology of the 
original sentences, such as the grammatical subject, tense, aspect, mode, 
and voice, perseveres in the commission report. In both texts, the 
grammatical subject slots are occupied by non-human phenomenal 
nouns (such as the first stage, retrieval) and demonstratives that refer to 
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them (e.g. this). Similarly, all verbs are in present tense, simple aspect, and 
all the main clauses are in indicative mode and use active voice. 
While both the preliminary hearing and the commission report are 
both legal genres, thus falling under the same Bhatia’s (2004) 
professional genre, these two genres are clearly different genres with 
their own general communicative purposes. Thus, the linguistic 
repetition in (4) constitutes Bhatia’s colonization that invades and 
compromises the generic integrity of one genre by another. 
This point is important because the above transcript segment is an 
utterance by an academic expert; therefore, the linguistic repetitions of 
these utterances in the commission report represent an opportunity for 
academic experts to potentially colonize legal genres with academic ones. 
This means that the worldviews and values of academic genres can 
potentially have an influence on the legal genres, perhaps allowing the 
legal professionals to see the world from the academic point of view. Of 
course, such colonization effort is neither simple nor easy because of all 
the legal constraints mentioned earlier. However, evidence suggests that 
such colonization is possible. The excerpt in (5) illustrates an instance in 
which a counsel (Q) voluntarily introduces a psychological term from 
another expert to make sense of the testimony of the current expert (A): 
 
(5) 
Q Yes, thank you. And the identification process utilized at any 
point in time is one of those I think Dr. Loftus calls it a post 
event factor that can shape one’s memory that has been acquired 
and retained? 
A Certainly. (p. 9959-9960) 
 
In addition to these lexical, phrasal, clausal, and morphological 
repetitions, the commission report also preserves rhetorical elements, 
such as emphasis and qualification. The following example comes from a 
section in the preliminary hearing transcript, in which a law expert 
testifies about the goals of tort laws, followed by the commissioner’s use 
of this testimony. 
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(6a) [Transcript] And while the goals of tort are many, it’s often 
said that the primary function of tort law is to provide first all for 
compensation for an injured party. . . . A second goal of tort 
would be in the deterrence of conduct seen to be problematic or 
below a certain standard of expected performance. (p. 1266-1267) 
(6b) [Commission Report] The primary goal of tort law is to 
compensate the injured party and, secondly, to act as a deterrent 
to misconduct (p. 93). 
 
Ideationally, (6b) is a summary (6a). Linguistically, we see 
repetitions of lexemes (e.g. compensation vs. compensate, deterrence vs. 
deterrent) as well as other morphological elements, such as the 
grammatical subject, mode and voice. In addition, what perseveres in 
(6b) are the parts in (6a) that are given rhetorical emphasis. The first 
sentence of (6a) rhetorically emphasizes “the primary function of tort 
law is to provide...” through its syntactic position (right branch in the 
main clause) as well as its rhetorical position (“new” slot in the given-
new contract [see KOLLN, 2007]). Because what is stated is given a 
greater rhetorical emphasis than what is not stated, one could argue that 
this pair represents a repetition of rhetorical emphasis in addition to the 
linguistic and ideational repetitions. 
These examples may appear remarkable and exceptional in the 
extent to which the expert utterances are repeated, but these examples 
are, in fact, typical of how the commission report used expert testimony. 
Indeed, a similar analysis of the entire expert sections in the commission 
report reveals that almost every sentence is directly traceable to a specific 
segment in the transcript with abundant linguistic repetitions. Only 16 
out of 226 sentences or approximately 7% of all the sentences did not 
have an obvious corresponding section in the transcript. 
In addition to the linguistic and rhetorical repetitions, the 
commissioner’s use of the transcript is also obvious at the level of 
organization. Ideas in the expert sections of the commission report are 
clearly organized in the order they appear in the transcript. To 
demonstrate this organizational influence, Table 2 lists the first ten 
sentences from the Loftus and O’Shaughnessy (two experts) sections of 
the commission report. The number(s) next to each sentence is (are) the 
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page numbers in the transcript where the corresponding section can be 
found. A question mark in the transcript page indicates that the sentence 
is one of 16 sentences with no corresponding section in the transcript. 
 
Loftus O’Shaughnessy 
Cory Report Transcript p. Cory Report Transcript p. 
Dr. Loftus is a full professor... 8915 Dr. O’Shaughnessy is... 1574 
Her curriculum vitae is filled... 8914 He is presently the... 1576-1577 
She has conducted... 8916-8917 Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s... 1574-1579 
Her 1996 report,... 8921 Dr. O’Shaughnessy was... ? 
Since that report... 8921 As I started earlier... ? 
She testified that memory... 8922 In Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s... 1590 
Research has been... 8923 He testified that... 1591 
The acquisition phase... 8923 He is totally preoccupied... 1592 
After the event is... 8923 He has experienced... 1592 
Finally, there is ... 8923 He has an obsessional... 1593 
 
Figure 2 – Cross-referencing Cory Report and Transcript 
 
The figure clearly shows a corresponding progression between the 
commission report and the transcript, indicating that the organization in 
the preliminary hearing contributed to the organization of the 
commission report. But this prevalence of the linguistic and rhetorical 
uptake does not lead us to the conclusion that academic researchers have 
direct influence on policy recommendations. These expert utterances are 
already partially shaped by the explicit and implicit rules of the legal 
community, the form and content of the question, and the mediation by 
the oral genre of the preliminary hearing. Furthermore, not all expert 
utterances were repeated, and it was at the commissioner’s discretion to 
decide which expert utterances were ultimately repeated and how these 
utterances were framed, sequenced, and judged in the final report. 
In short, the commission report is both ideationally and 
linguistically influenced by research, but this influence is made possible 
by “recreating” the academic content and language in the legal genre of 
preliminary hearing. 
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5.3 Will to truth 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, counsels made various 
discourse moves to emphasize judicial and policy genres and to 
encourage expert witnesses to “recreate” research knowledge within the 
judicial genre of preliminary hearing. Subsequently, the commissioner’s 
attribution of research knowledge is mostly to the preliminary hearing, 
the transcript of the preliminary hearing, or the researchers as expert 
witnesses (85% of all the attributed research knowledge in the report); 
considerably less attribution to other sources are found (15% to written 
research genres but other knowledge claims are unattributed.) 
Superficially, there is nothing interesting about the commissioner’s 
attribution practice. The terms of reference for this commission 
specifically designated the preliminary hearing as the fact finding venue, 
so the commissioner was simply observing this legal obligation to gather 
and generate knowledge from the preliminary hearing and attributing to 
it. Yet many sources were brought into the preliminary hearing, filed as 
evidence, and influenced the commission’s final recommendations, and it 
is rather curious to note the absence of these sources from the 
commission report. The most conspicuous example is the Eyewitness 
Evidence, a practical guide for law enforcement, published by the National 
Institute of Justice. This booklet contains practical advice grounded in 
psychology research, and this source (filed as evidence in the preliminary 
hearing) appears very influential in some of the recommendations in the 
commission report:  
 
(7a) [Eyewitness Evidence] Instruct the witness that the person 
who committed the crime may or may not be present in the 
group of individuals (p. 32). 
(7b) [Commission Report] The officer should emphasize to 
the witness that the suspect may not be in the line-up (p. 31, 
emphasis in original). 
(8a) [Eye Witness Evidence] Select fillers who generally fit the 
witness’ description of the perpetrator. When there is a 
limited/inadequate description of the perpetrator provided by the 
witness, or when the description of the perpetrator differs 
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significantly from the appearance of the suspect, fillers should 
resemble the suspect in significant features (p. 30). 
(8b) [Commission report] The filler in the line-up should 
match as closely as possible the descriptions given by the 
eyewitnesses at the time of the event. It is only if that is 
impossible, that the fillers should resemble the suspect as 
closely as possible (p. 31, emphasis in original.). 
 
Yet, the Eyewitness Evidence is never mentioned in the commission 
report, and the commissioner’s explanation of this absence is rather 
curious. 
 
Researcher: Quite a few of the recommendations in this section 
((pointing to p. 31-34 in the Cory report, recommendation 
section on eyewitnesses)) seem to come from Eyewitness Testimony 
((showing him the cover of the document and presenting it to 
him)). My first question is: How important is this document? 
Commissioner: No! This is just part of the background! Part of 
the background! Part of the (matrix) you gather your 
recommendations from all the evidence that you have considered 
and accepted, and to say that dominates? No. You have to all sort 
the evidence of Elizabeth Loftus, evidence of the other chap that 
has an international reputation on eyewitness ( ) 
Researcher: Yes 
Commissioner: And, generally, it’s always the sum total of the 
evidence that leads you to the conclusion. ( ) and the sum is 
always greater than the parts. 
___________________________________________ 
Notes transcription conventions 
(( )): transcriber’s description 
( ): inaudible 
(word): dubious hearing 
____________________________________________ 
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A superficial interpretation of the commissioner’s utterance is 
problematic. In light of the discourse data, it seems unlikely that all 
testimonies were given equal weight as they disappeared in the 
background, and such explanation reveals nothing about the process of 
decision making. Finally, the commissioner’s comment suggests idealized 
neutrality, objectivity, and independence, which many of us (informed by 
postmodern theories) find rather difficult to accept. Given these 
problems, it may be tempting to dismiss the commissioner’s response as 
a result of “bias, poor recall and poor or inaccurate articulation” (YIN, 
2003, p. 92). After all, the inquiry took place seven years ago, and 
interviewees (including the commissioner) frankly admitted problems of 
recalling specifics. 
Yet, the commissioner’s unwillingness to discuss an obviously 
important source suggests that Foucault’s will to truth may be at play. In 
order to analyze the commissioner’s interview data, it is perhaps useful 
to remind ourselves what methodologists say about interview data. Far 
from being an objective description of reality, interview data should be 
viewed as an account that has been “filtered and modified by his cognitive and 
emotional reactions and reported through his personal verbal usage” (DEAN; 
WHYTE, 1970, p. 120, emphasis in original). Given this characterization 
of interview data and Foucault’s discursive formation, we should treat 
interviews as eliciting a socially and discursively constructed framework 
of a participant and the objects that are filtered through that framework. 
This Foucauldian view allows us to recognize the commissioner’s 
stake in the legal system. As described earlier, a commissioner is legally 
and discursively constructed as a judge, and, thus, he is expected to fulfill 
responsibilities that are ordinarily associated with a judge, such as 
neutrality, objectivity, and independence. It is through this formally 
assigned role that the commissioner’s recommendations are received and 
accepted as valid. 
Therefore, it misses the point if we dismiss those idealized 
qualities of a judge on the ground that these qualities are literally 
impossible in our framework, our own disciplinary discursive formations, 
and our rules of exclusion. Rather, we need to examine how the legal 
discursive formations enable the possibility of these qualities, and how 
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Commissioner Cory rhetorically possesses those qualities. In doing so, 
we must separate Cory’s role from the individual who occupies this 
position: The flesh-and-blood Cory may not be immune to biases and 
prior knowledge, like every other human being, but these human 
qualities are masked by the legal will to truth, and Cory-the-
Commissioner must be and is construed as neutral, objective, and 
independent. 
This assumption is crucial to the working of the legal system 
because admitting a lack of these idealized qualities would invalidate his 
recommendations, just as much as lack neutrality of a trial judge is 
grounds for overturning a verdict. Under this condition the 
commissioner could not afford to speak outside this discursive 
formation; as a representative of this system, he must propagate the 
validity of this will to truth. 
This explanation is supported by several other segments of the 
interview, in which the commissioner consistently rejected the idea of 
any prior knowledge or opinions. (“You wouldn’t be a useful 
commissioner if you had made up your mind.”) Similarly, his description 
of his decision making process de-emphasized any specific connections 
and influences from individual sources  
The discourse and interview data suggest that the judicial system 
inscribes its ideology in their genres to ensure judicial authority and 
independence, but this existing mechanism already allows knowledge 
mobilization (both at the level of content and language). However, the 
influence must be negotiated and “recreated” within a legal genre 
(preliminary hearing in this case) before it is effective. As a result, the 
influence may be made invisible through Foucault’s will to truth, and as 
we saw in the last analysis section, direct questioning through an 
interview may not unmask the hidden process. 
These findings suggest that (social) scientific experts may be able 
to contribute to knowledge mobilization by recreating the content and 
language of their research. In addition, careful phrasing of oral testimony 
can lead to Bhatia’s colonization of legal genres. At the same time, the 
analysis illustrates some limitations of interviewing, suggesting that 
language analysis should be an important component in understanding 
knowledge mobilization. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This case study has revealed the ways in which judicial ideology is 
implicated in judicial genres: These genres perform the dual function of 
limiting and facilitating knowledge mobilization while obscuring the 
means of performing this dual function. The legal ideology, then, allows 
knowledge mobilization but this is made possible not by confronting the 
ideology. Rather, this case study suggests that academic researchers have 
a better chance of achieving knowledge mobilization by working within 
the constraints of the judicial ideology and genres, “recreating” enough 
(but not too much) content and form from academic genres for the 
influence to be meaningful. Of course, generalizability of these findings 
is limited by the fact that the current study is a case study. But the 
analysis illustrates the ways in which genre scholars can contribute to the 
scholarly inquiry of knowledge mobilization. At the same time, genre 
researchers are encouraged to examine similar cases to see if these 
patterns may be found in other cases in order to address the inherent 
limitation of a single case study.  
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Título: Gênero, ideologia e conhecimento na pesquisa acadêmica e nas políticas públicas 
Autor: Tosh Tachino 
Resumo: Nos últimos 30 anos os estudiosos de gênero têm explorado a dimensão ideológica do gênero, 
ilustrando como os gêneros compelem os indivíduos a agir de determinada maneira, e como os indivíduos 
respondem a eles. O presente artigo enfoca a visão ideológica de gênero e analisa o problema da 
mobilização do conhecimento como uma negociação ideológica entre gêneros legais e de pesquisa. Usando a 
vontade de verdade de Foucault e a colonização de Bhatia, este estudo de caso analisa um questionário 
público canadense que usou pesquisa em psicologia e influenciou vários documentos legais e de políticas 
públicas. A análise da comissão relatora, transcrições de audiências preliminares, e entrevistas revelam a 
maneira como a ideologia jurídica esta inscrita nos gêneros jurídicos que regulam a extensão e o modo 
como se dá a mobilização do conhecimento. 
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Resumen: En los últimos 30 años los estudiosos de género han explorado la dimensión ideológica del 
género, ilustrando como los géneros impelen a los individuos a actuar de determinada manera, y como los 
individuos responden a ellos. El presente artículo enfoca la visión ideológica de género y analiza el 
problema de la mobilización del conocimiento como una negociación ideológica entre géneros legales y de 
investigación. Usando la voluntad de verdad de Foucault y la colonización de Bhatia, este estudio de caso 
analiza un cuestionario público canadiense que usó investigación en sicología e influenció varios 
documentos legales y de políticas públicas. El análisis de la comisión relatora, transcripciones de 
audiencias preliminares, y entrevistas revelan la manera como la ideología jurídica está inscripta en los 
géneros jurídicos que regulan la extensión y el modo como se da la mobilización del conocimiento. 
Palabras-clave: Género. Ideología. Colonización.  
 
 
 
